This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to this generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the UK are statistically different from the one implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function.
This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of monetary policy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted inflation rate. The preference specification permits different weights for positive and negative inflation deviations from the target and includes as a special case the quadratic loss function employed in previous literature. The symmetry of the quadratic form implies that the loss associated with an inflation deviation from the target depends solely on its magnitude. In contrast, under asymmetric preferences both the magnitude and sign of a deviation matter to the central banker.
Arguments in favor of the quadratic loss function include that it is tractable, yields simple analytical results, and might provide a reasonable approximation to the central banker's preferences. On the other hand, recent anecdotal and empirical evidence appears consistent with the notion of asymmetric preferences. For example, Clarida and Gertler (1997) estimate a reaction function for the Bundesbank and find that it raises the day-to-day interest rate when inflation is above its steady-state trend value but barely responds when it is below. Ruge-Murcia (2000) estimates implicit bounds for the Canadian inflation target zone using data on market-determined nominal interest rates. Results indicate that financial markets perceive the band to be of approximately the same width as announced but asymmetrically distributed around the official target.
The study of central bank preferences is framed here in a specific institutional setup. Publicly announced inflation targets have been adopted recently by several countries (for example, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the UK, and Sweden). Under this arrangement, the central bank commits itself to gear monetary policy toward keeping a measure of inflation close to an explicit target. Following Svensson (1997) , Beetsma and Jensen (1998) , and Muscatelli (1999) , the central banker's loss function is defined around this target. Because the target is observable, it is possible to compare inflation realizations and the stated policy goal. This simplifies the estimation strategy and reduces the number of parameters to be estimated and means that the model generates testable empirical implications, regardless of whether the target is the socially optimal rate or not.
Previous game-theoretical models with quadratic preferences predict a positive linear relationship between inflation and unemployment, and an average rate of inflation strictly larger than the inflation target (see Green, 1996, and Svensson, 1997) . In contrast, the model with asymmetric preferences predicts a positive but nonlinear relationship between inflation and unemployment, and inflation can be on average above or below the target depending on the central banker's preference parameters. To understand this result, recall that relaxing the assumption of quadratic preferences means that certainty equivalence no longer holds. Then, the expected marginal cost of departing from the inflation target is nonlinear in inflation. When the central banker associates a larger loss to positive inflation deviations from the target than to negative deviations, uncertainty raises the expected marginal cost and induces prudent behavior on the part of the central banker.
The asymmetric model also implies that the conditional variance of inflation is helpful in forecasting its mean. The asymmetry preference parameter is the coefficient of the conditional variance. Since the quadratic model corresponds to the special case where this coefficient is zero, one can test the null hypothesis of quadratic preferences against the well-defined alternative of asymmetric preferences. In an empirical application to Canada, Sweden, and the UK, results support the notion of asymmetric preferences in the form of a positive and statistically significant estimate of the asymmetry preference parameter. Results are robust to relaxing the assumption of normality of the shocks but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the model, derives conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and outlines the empirical implications; Section 2 constructs a reduced-form version of the model, reports empirical estimates, and examines the robustness of the results; and Section 3 concludes.
THE MODEL
The model consists of (1) a central banker who implements monetary policy and (2) a continuum of identical individuals assumed to construct their expectations rationally. In what follows, this continuum will be referred to as the public.
The Economy
The economic behavior of the public is summarized by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve 1 :
where λ Ͼ 0;u t , u n t , and π t are (respectively) the rates of unemployment, natural unemployment, and inflation; π e t is the public's forecast of inflation at time t constructed at time t Ϫ 1; and η t is a supply disturbance assumed independently and
2 The choice of unemployment as a measure of real economic activity has no effect on the analytical derivations below and allows the comparison of empirical results in Section 2 with theoretical predictions in earlier literature. Under the assumption of rational expectations,
where E tϪ1 is the expectation conditional on all information available at time t Ϫ 1. The public's information set at time t Ϫ 1 is denoted by I tϪ1 and includes the model parameters and realizations of the variables up to and including period t Ϫ 1. Since inflation targets are preannounced, future inflation targets also form part of I tϪ1 . The natural rate of unemployment evolves over time according to
where
represents the unpredictable component of the natural rate and is uncorrelated with η t . All roots of the polynomial 1 Ϫ ͚ qϪ1 iϭ1 θ i z i are assumed to lie outside the unit circle. Modeling the natural rate of unemployment as timevarying is important for at least two reasons. First, it seems plausible that changes in technology, labor force demographics, unionization rates, and welfare benefits could affect the labor market and generate movements in the natural rate. For the U.S., Weiner (1993) , Tootell (1994) , and Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) report evidence that the natural rate has changed during the postwar period. Shimer (1998) argues that in the absence of the baby boom, the rate of unemployment would have neither increased in the 1960s and 1970s nor fallen afterward. Second, although the assumption that u n t is constant can be innocuous for some theoretical results, it leads to the empirical prediction that realized unemployment is white noise. However, for most countries and sample periods the rate of unemployment is serially correlated and substantially persistent.
The central banker affects the inflation rate through a policy instrument. We can think of this instrument as a monetary aggregate or a short-term nominal interest rate. The instrument is imperfect in the sense that it cannot determine inflation completely:
where f(·) is a monotonic, continuous, and differentiable function, i t is the policy instrument, and
is a control error that represents imperfections in the conduct of monetary policy and is uncorrelated with η t and ζ t .
3 Since i t is chosen at time t Ϫ 1, it follows that i t ʦ I tϪ1 . This simple specification relaxes the usual assumption that the central banker chooses directly the rate of inflation after observing (before the public does) the random shocks. The central banker here has no informational advantage over the public since neither of them observe at time t Ϫ 1 the realization of the disturbances at time t. Because there is no private information, the central banker's information set coincides with the public's and is also given by I t .
The Central Banker
The central banker is assumed to have preferences over inflation and unemployment. Preferences are described by the function:
where C : ᑬ 2 →ᑬ, π t is the inflation target, ũ t is the unemployment target, and φ is a positive coefficient that measures the relative importance of unemployment stabilization. In the institutional setup considered here, the inflation target is assigned by the government to the central banker before time t. A general model for ũ t is presented below.
In contrast to most of the previous literature, where both components of the central banker's loss function are quadratic, the inflation component in Equation (5) is given by the linex function g(x) ϭ (exp(αx) Ϫ αx Ϫ 1)րα 2 (Varian 1974 ). Zellner (1986) , Granger and Pesaran (1996) , and Christoffersen and Diebold (1997) study this function in the context of optimal forecasting. Nobay and Peel (1998) study optimal commitment and discretion in monetary policy using this loss function. In order to develop some intuition, the linex function is plotted in Figure 1A for the special case where α Ͼ 0. For rates of inflation above the target, the exponential term eventually dominates and the loss associated with a positive deviation rises exponentially. For rates of inflation below the target, it is the linear term that becomes progressively more important as inflation decreases and, consequently, the loss rises linearly. This asymmetry can be easily seen by considering, for example, the loss associated with a ±1 inflation deviation from π t . It is apparent that even though their magnitudes are the same, the Ϫ1 deviation delivers a smaller loss than the ϩ1 deviation does. Hence, positive inflation deviations are weighted more It is useful to compare the linex function with the very familiar quadratic loss function in Figure 1B . The quadratic function is symmetric around zero. This means that positive and negative deviations of the same size yield exactly the same loss. Hence, only the magnitude, and not the sign, of the deviation is important for the central banker. Applying L'Hôpital's rule, it is possible to show that the quadratic function can be obtained as a special case of the linex function when the asymmetry parameter (α) tends to zero. 4 This result is important because it proves that the preference specification employed here nests the one assumed in earlier literature as a special case. It also suggests that the hypothesis that the central banker's preferences are quadratic over inflation could be tested econometrically by evaluating whether α is significantly different from zero.
The functional form in Equation (5) is attractive because it is analytically tractable, yields a closed-form solution when shocks are normally distributed, and generates clear empirical predictions. In principle, one could extend it to allow asymmetries regarding unemployment. This possibility is discussed in Section 2.4, where it is shown that the basic predictions of the model are unchanged by this extension. In related research, Ruge-Murcia (2001a) estimates a model with asymmetric unemployment preferences for the G7 countries. Reduced-form estimates do not support the hypothesis of asymmetric unemployment preferences for Canada and the UK.
The targeted rate of unemployment is assumed proportional to the expected natural rate:
Previous literature usually assumes that ũ t is strictly less than the natural rate (i.e., 0 Ͻ k Ͻ 1). This assumption is based on the notion that distortions in goods and labor markets render the natural rate of unemployment higher than socially optimal. Persson and Tabellini (2000) note that this assumption is crucial in generating an inflation bias in the linear-quadratic framework of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) . On the other hand, King (1996) and Blinder (1998) suggest on the basis of institutional evidence that central bankers target the expected natural rate of unemployment (i.e., k ϭ 1). Both views are accommodated here by allowing 0 Ͻ k ≤ 1. Analytical results obtained under both assumptions are compared below.
Nash Equilibrium
The problem of the central banker at time t Ϫ 1 is to choose the value of the instrument that minimizes her expected loss, E tϪ1 (C(π t , u t )). The minimization is made subject to the expectations-augmented Phillips curve [Equation (1)] and takes as given the public's inflation forecast and the inflation target. The first-order necessary condition is
where σ 2 π denotes the conditional variance of inflation. Since the loss function is globally convex, the solution to Equation (7) delivers a unique minimum. In deriving Equation (7), I have used the fact that when shocks are normal, the distribution of inflation (conditional on the information set) is also normal. Thus, exp(α (π t Ϫ π t )) is distributed log normal with mean exp(α(E tϪ1 π t Ϫ π t ) ϩ ασ 2 π ր2). In the quadratic model, the first-order condition of the central banker's minimization problem is linear and can be solved explicitly to obtain her reaction function in terms of the public's inflation forecast, π e t .
5 To see this, take the limit of Equation (7) as α → 0 and rearrange to obtain
The central banker's reaction is linear and monotonically increasing on the public's inflation forecast (note that 0 Ͻ λ 2 φր(1 ϩ λ 2 φ) Ͻ 1). It is trivial to show that in this case, the Nash equilibrium always exists and is unique.
In contrast, under asymmetric preferences, the first-order condition only defines the reaction function implicitly:
Using the implicit function theorem, it is possible to show that
, for all values of α. Hence, as in the quadratic model, the central banker's reaction is a monotonically increasing function of the public's inflation forecast. Also
which is less than zero for α Ͼ 0, equal to zero for α → 0, and larger than zero for α Ͻ 0. In other words, for α Ͼ 0 (α Ͻ 0) the central banker's reaction is a concave (convex) function of π e t . In order to develop further the reader's intuition and to illustrate future theoretical results, it is useful to plot the central banker's reaction function for different values of the preference parameter α. This is done in Figure 2 under the assumption that the inflation target is π ϭ 0, and the remaining parameters are λ ϭ 2, φ ϭ 0.5, k ϭ 0.8, u n ϭ 5, and σ 2 π ϭ 2.5 2 . Treating all parameters as fixed, the central banker's reaction was computed by solving numerically the implicit function in Equation (9) for given values of π e . The figure also includes the reaction function of the quadratic central banker and the public's reaction function that is summarized by the rational expectations relation, Equation (2). Graphically, the Nash equilibrium is the point where Equations (9) and (2) intersect.
Although in all cases the central banker's reaction is an increasing function of π e , her willingness to accommodate the public's inflation forecast depends on the preference parameter α. Consider the case where α Ͻ 0. The central banker responds to π e t at an increasing rate, and the inflation rate will be larger than under quadratic preferences. For values of α ≤ Ϫ1ր(λφ(1 Ϫ k)E tϪ1 u n t ), there is no finite rate of inflation at which Equations (9) and (2) intersect, and the Nash equilibrium will not exist [see Proposition 1 below]. Consider now the case where α Ͼ 0. The central banker accommodates the public's inflation forecast at a decreasing rate, and inflation will be always smaller than under quadratic preferences. For large-enough values of α, a deflationary bias, whereby inflation systematically undershoots its targeted value, can arise in equilibrium. This result is important because it shows that asymmetric preferences can provide a theoretical foundation for Stanley Fischer's observation that a deflationary bias is a possible outcome in the practice of monetary policy (Fischer 1994). 6 Conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are presented in the following proposition:
Proof of Proposition 1: To prove existence, construct a
Plugging Equation (10) into Equation (9) and using π e t ϭ E tϪ1 π t yields h(E tϪ1 π t , π e ) ϭ 0. To show uniqueness, assume there exists a second inflation forecast, say π
that also lies on the 45Њ line on the plane (π e t , E tϪ1 π t ) and satisfies h(E tϪ1 π t , π e t ) ϭ 0. Replace π e t in Equation (9) and simplify to obtain (1 ϩ αλφ(1 Ϫ k)E tϪ1 u n )(exp(αx) Ϫ 1)րα ϭ 0. Since 1 ϩ αλφ(1 Ϫ k)E tϪ1 u n t Ͼ 0 and α ≠ 0, then it must be the case that x ϭ 0. Proof of Corollary 1: The result follows from noting that when k ϭ 1, the condition 1 ϩ αλφ(1 Ϫ k)E tϪ1 u n t Ͼ 0 is always satisfied.
From this proposition follows
Notice in Equation (10) that depending on the sign of α, inflation is an increasing or decreasing function of its conditional variance. Recall that when the loss function is quadratic, certainty equivalence holds and the model solution is the same regardless of whether there is uncertainty or not. In contrast, when the loss function is asymmetric on inflation, the marginal cost of departing from π t is not linear in inflation but convex (when α Ͼ 0) or concave (when α Ͻ 0). When α Ͼ 0, an increase in uncertainty raises the expected marginal cost of deviating from π t . Then, uncertainty induces a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. A comparable result can be found in the literature on precautionary savings. When the assumption of quadratic utility is relaxed and labor-income risk is nondiversifiable, uncertainty increases the expected marginal utility of future consumption. To satisfy the Euler condition, prudent households decrease current consumption compared with future consumption and increase their savings.
It is easy to show (see Ruge-Murcia 2001b ) that the stochastic processes of inflation and unemployment implied by this model are
and
where the notation π t (α) makes explicit the dependence of inflation on the parameter that measures the asymmetry in the central banker's preferences. The conditional variance of inflation is Var(π t I tϪ1 ) ϭ σ 2 π ϭ σ 2 ε . As usual, the unemployment rate realized in equilibrium does not differ systematically from the expected natural rate. Under current inflation targeting arrangements, the targets are publicly announced and, consequently, are observable by the econometrician. This means that Equation (11) generates testable empirical implications regardless of whether π t is socially optimal or not.
7 These predictions are derived in the following section.
Implications
The model predictions can be formulated in terms of either the rate of inflation or its deviation from the announced target. For the general case where the loss function is asymmetric, it is trivial to rewrite Equation (11) as
Notice that the term
can be positive or negative depending on the sign of the preference parameter α. Consider first the case α Ͻ 0, meaning that the central banker weights positive deviations from the target less severely than negative ones. Since Ϫ(αր2)σ 2 π is larger than zero, the average inflation deviation from the target is unambiguously positive. Consider now the case α Ͼ 0, meaning that the central banker weights positive deviations from the target more severely than negative ones. Then, (αր2)σ 2 π Ͼ 0, and for certain parameter values, it is possible that its magnitude is sufficiently large so that π t (α) Ϫ π t Ͻ 0. Hence, inflation could be on average below the announced target. In summary, under asymmetric preferences, inflation could be systematically above or below its target depending on the central banker's preference parameter α.
The asymmetric model predicts that the conditional variance of inflation is helpful in predicting its mean. In a cross section, this means, for example, that if α Ͼ 0, countries with more volatile inflation should have a lower average inflation deviation from target. Ruge-Murcia (2001c) examines this prediction using cross-section data from 21 OECD countries. In a time-series, the preference parameter is statistically identified from the coefficient of the conditional variance of inflation and from the nonlinear term on unemployment.
As a comparison, it is useful to derive the implications of the model with quadratic preferences. Take the limit of Equation (13) as α → 0 to obtain
Since the term λφ(1 Ϫ k)E tϪ1 u n t is nonnegative, the average realization of π t (0) Ϫ π t is also nonnegative. When 0 Ͻ k Ͻ 1, this model predicts that inflation is systematically above the announced target. Because this overshooting is rationally anticipated by the public, it follows that the targeting policy can only be imperfectly credible (Svensson 1997) . Quadratic preferences also imply that the relation between inflation and unemployment is linear and that the conditional variance has no explanatory power on the current deviation from the target. If one generalizes Svensson's model to allow the case where the central banker targets the natural rate of unemployment (k ϭ 1), the model predicts that the average inflation deviation from the target is zero.
As previous game-theoretical models of monetary policy, the rates of inflation and unemployment are predicted to be positively correlated when 0 Ͻ k Ͻ 1. However, under asymmetric preferences, the relationship is nonlinear. The analysis of the data in Section 2.2 suggests that the nonlinear model yields a more accurate fit of the inflation/unemployment observations than does the linear specification.
In the special case where the central banker targets the natural rate of unemployment (k ϭ 1), the model predicts no systematic relationship between inflation and unemployment. However, an inflation bias can still arise in the case where α Ͻ 0. This suggests that the result that the inflation bias is zero when k ϭ 1 (see McCallum, 1997, and Blinder, 1998) is not robust to the generalization of the central banker's loss function. 8 In the more plausible case where α Ͼ 0, a pure deflationary bias arises and inflation is on average below its target for any positive α.
Finally, consider the effect on the inflation deviation from target of an innovation that increases the public's forecast of the natural rate. In the quadratic case,
which is positive, constant, and independent of the expected rate of unemployment when the innovation takes place. In the asymmetric case,
, which is also positive but depends on the expected unemployment rate. For example, when α Ͼ 0, the innovation always has a smaller effect than in the quadratic model and the effect decreases with the rate of unemployment. The empirical predictions of the models with quadratic and asymmetric preferences are summarized in Table 1 .
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

The Data
The empirical predictions of the model are examined using monthly observations of the rates unemployment and annual inflation for Canada, Sweden, and the UK. In Canada, inflation targets were announced in February 1991 and applied from December 1992 onward. The target applies to a measure of "core" inflation that excludes the volatile food and energy components and the first-round effect of changes in indirect taxes. The annual percentage change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Core CPI were obtained from the Weekly Financial Statistics published by the Bank of Canada (http://www.bankofcanada.ca).
In Sweden, inflation targets were announced in January 1993 and applied from January 1995 onward. The target applies to the annual change in the CPI with no exclusions. The raw CPI series was taken from the web site of the Riksbank (http:// www.riksbank.se). In the UK, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced inflation targets in October 1992. The targeted measure of inflation is the annual change in the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments (or RPIX). Both the RPI and the RPIX were taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Note that by design, inflation targets are intended to apply to annual, rather than to monthly, inflation. However, because (1) annual inflation is the sum of the 12 No Yes most recent observations of monthly inflation, (2) the policy holds continuously, and (3) past rates of monthly inflation are predetermined at time t, it is possible to estimate the model using data observed at a higher frequency than the time horizon for which the policy is defined. See Ruge-Murcia (2000) for a discussion. Unemployment is measured by the survey-based, seasonally adjusted rate of unemployment published by OECD Main Economic Indicators. The sample periods are as follows. Canada from 1992:12 to 2000:6, Sweden from 1995:1 to 2000:6, and the UK from 1992:10 to 2000:6. The different sample periods start at the time when the inflation targeting policy took effect in each country and end with the latest available observation of the variables at the time the data were collected.
A Rough Look at the Data
Prior to estimation, this section uses simple summary statistics and plots to examine to what extend the model predictions are (or are not) borne out by the data. Consider first the predictions of the quadratic and asymmetric models regarding the average inflation deviation from the target. Under quadratic preferences, inflation should be on average above or at the target. Under asymmetric preferences, inflation can be on average above or below the target depending on the sign and magnitude of the preference parameter α. A negative average inflation deviation from the announced target is suggestive of a positive value of α. Table 2 contains the sample mean of π t Ϫ π t and the percentage of inflation observations above and below the target. The statistics computed using the targeted measure of inflation are reported in Columns (1), (3), and (4). For Canada and Sweden, the average inflation deviation from the target is negative and quantitatively important (Ϫ0.61 and Ϫ1.23, respectively), and the proportion of observations below target is high (91.2% and 81.2%, respectively). In the case of Sweden, the average deviation is below the lower limit of its inflation target zone. For the UK, the average deviation is small and positive (0.15) and 69.9% of the observations are above π t . These statistics are robust to using broader aggregate price measures. For Canada, the average CPI inflation deviation from the target is Ϫ0.69, and 76.9% of the observations are below target. For the UK the average RPI inflation deviation from the target is 0.06, and 55.9% of the observations are above target. A second prediction common to game-theoretical models of monetary policy is that the rates of inflation and unemployment are positively correlated. Analytical results in Section 1 show that this prediction is robust to generalizing the functional form of the central banker's loss function. However, under asymmetric preferences the relation between inflation and unemployment is nonlinear and concave. In the special case where k ϭ 1, both models predict no relationship between inflation and unemployment.
Because the inflation target is predetermined and publicly known, the prediction that π t and u t are positively related means that the inflation deviation from the target and unemployment should be positively related as well. As a very rough evaluation of this prediction, consider the Least Squares projection of π t Ϫ π t on a constant and the unemployment rate. Because u t is endogenous, this projection was carried out by Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) using lagged unemployment as an instrument for current unemployment. The estimates of this regression are reported in Table 3 . For Canada, the coefficient on unemployment is negative and significantly different from zero. For Sweden and the UK the coefficients are positive, but significantly different from zero only in the latter case. Hence, the prediction that the inflation deviation from target and the unemployment rate are positively related is supported by UK data and to some extent by Swedish data but not by Canadian data.
Since the prediction of the model with asymmetric preferences is that the relation is positive but nonlinear, Table 3 also reports the results of a TSLS regression of π t Ϫ π t on a constant, u t , and u 2 t . Notice that the coefficients on u t are positive and statistically different from zero at the 5% level in all cases. The coefficients on u 2 t are negative and statistically different from zero at the 5% level in all cases. This result supports the notion of a nonlinear, concave relation between the inflation deviation from target and unemployment. Note that the R 2 s of the nonlinear model are considerably larger than the ones of the linear model.
Although the statistics reported in this section are provocative, they must be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, since the inflation series correspond to monthly observations of annual inflation, the data points are serially correlated and do not constitute independent evidence against quadratic preferences. Second, the statistics make no use of the restrictions embodied in the economic model constructed in Section 1. A more formal analysis of the data is performed below.
FIML Estimation
The simple game-theoretical model developed in Section 1 consists of three variables, namely the natural rate of unemployment and the rates of inflation and unemployment. Although data on inflation and unemployment are readily available, the natural rate is not directly observable. 10 In order to allow the estimation of the model using observations on inflation and unemployment alone, a reducedform version is constructed. Ruge-Murcia (2001b) shows that when the natural rate of unemployment follows the AR(q) process in Equation (3) and the structural shocks are mutually uncorrelated at all leads and lags, the first-difference of unemployment can be written in reduced-form as an unrestricted ARMA(q, q ϩ 1) process. However, since the estimation of ARMA processes is frequently complicated by common factors and any stationary ARMA process can be approximated arbitrarily well by a finite autoregression, the unemployment process is estimated here in autoregressive form.
11
A reduced-form representation of inflation can be constructed by taking conditional expectations in both sides of Equation (12) to obtain E tϪ1 u n t ϭ E tϪ1 u t . This result follows from the fact that unemployment differs from the natural rate only by a mean-zero and serially-uncorrelated random term. Hence, the forecast of u n t is identical to the forecast of u t , when both are based on the same information set, I tϪ1 . The latter can be constructed on the basis of past observations of unemployment alone. Substituting in Equation (11) yields
where γ ϭ λφ(1 Ϫ k) ≥ 0 is a constant coefficient. γ ϭ 0 in the special case where the central banker targets the natural rate of unemployment (k ϭ 1). The bivariate process of inflation and unemployment was estimated by the numerical maximization of their joint log-likelihood function. Since this function imposes the cross-equation restrictions that arise from the dependence of inflation on E tϪ1 u t , its maximization yields consistent and efficient Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimates of the parameters. Asymptotic standard errors were computed using as estimate of the variance-covariance matrix the inverse of the Hessian of the log-likelihood function at the maximum. In order to assess the robustness of the results to deviations from the assumption of normality, QuasiMaximum Likelihood standard errors were also computed and used in statistical inference.
Prior to estimation, Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests were performed on the rate of unemployment. The level of augmentation (i.e., the number of first differences included in the regression) was selected using the MIC criterion in Ng and Perron (2001) . The ADF statistics for Canada, Sweden, and the UK are respectively 0.31, 0.48, and Ϫ1.55. Since these statistics are larger than the 5% critical value of the tabulated distribution, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. Similar results are reported, for example, by Broadbent and Barro (1997) and Ireland (1999) for US data. Estimates below will be based on the assumption that the public forecasts unemployment using an I(1) model. 12 The lag length of the AR representation for ∆u t was determined using Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC). After estimating processes with lag length 1 to 9, results indicated that the most appropriate specifications for ∆u t are AR(2), AR(3), and AR(3) for Canada, Sweden, and the UK, respectively.
FIML estimates for Canada, Sweden, and the UK are reported in Table 4 . In all cases, when the model is estimated using the targeted inflation measure [see Columns (1), (3), and (4)], estimates of the preference parameter α are positive and quantitatively large: 4.54 for Canada, 3.42 for Sweden, and 2.64 for the UK. This means that for the countries under consideration, positive inflation deviations from the target appear to be weighted more severely than are negative ones in the central banker's loss function, even if they are of the same magnitude. In the case of Canada, the null hypothesis that the true preference parameter is zero is rejected at the 1% significance level against the two-sided alternative that it is different from zero.
13
In the case of the UK, the hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level when one computes the t-statistic using the robust standard error, and at the 10% when one employs the asymptotic standard error. In the case of Sweden, the hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level when the t-statistic is computed using the robust standard error but cannot be rejected when one uses the asymptotic standard error. When one considers the test of the same hypothesis (α ϭ 0) against the one-sided alternative that α Ͼ 0, the null hypothesis is rejected in all cases at the 10% level (1% level in most cases). (14) and an AR process for ∆u t . The data is monthly from 1992:12 to 2000:6 (Canada), 1995:1 to 2000:6 (Sweden), and 1992:10 to 2000:6 (UK). The figures in parentheses are standard errors. The figures in brackets are robust standard errors. Estimates of the unemployment process are not reported here to save space but are available in Ruge-Murcia (2001b, Tables 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11) . α is the asymmetry preference parameter on inflation. α Ͼ 0 when the central banker weights more heavily positive than negative inflation deviations from the target in her loss function. γ is a reduced-form parameter that equals zero when the central banker targets the natural rate of unemployment. σ π is the conditional standard deviation of inflation.
The result that α Ͼ 0 for Canada and Sweden was to some extent anticipated by the sample statistics reported in Table 2 . However, recall that for the UK, these statistics revealed a small, but positive, average inflation deviation from target (0.15) and a substantial proportion of observations above target (69.9%). The finding that α is positive and significantly different from zero for the UK means that the average inflation deviation from target is too low to be consistent with a model with quadratic preferences. Figure 3 plots the central banker's loss functions implied by the estimates of the preference parameter α and compares them with the usual quadratic loss function (dotted line). Although there are some differences in the estimates of α for the three countries, their loss functions are similar in the range of interest. In all cases, negative deviations from the target are penalized much less than under a quadratic loss function. Small positive deviations from the target (say between 0 and 0.5) are penalized roughly in the same manner in all loss functions, including the quadratic. Large positive deviations from the target are penalized much more severely in the estimated asymmetric loss functions than in the quadratic.
Columns (2) and (5) in Table 4 reports estimates for Canada and the UK that are based on broader measures of inflation than the one targeted. In contrast to previous results, in this case it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of quadratic preferences. It appears that although the central banker treats asymmetrically the targeted inflation deviation from its goal, the loss associated with a headline inflation deviation depends primarily on its magnitude and not on its sign.
Consider now the estimates of γ. Recall that γ ϭ λφ(1 Ϫ k) ≥ 0 is a reduced-form parameter and its structural components λ, φ, and k are not identified separately. In particular, an estimate of γ cannot reveal the magnitude of k, the proportion of the natural rate that is targeted by the central bank. However, since λ, φ Ͼ 0, by assumption, the finding that γ ϭ 0 implies that the central banker targets the natural rate of unemployment (that is, k ϭ 1). On the other hand, the finding that γ Ͼ 0 only suggest that 0 Ͻ k Ͻ 1, but we cannot know whether the true value of k is 0.999 or any other value in the interval (0, 1).
For Sweden and UK, γ is positive except in the case when one uses RPI inflation as a measure of inflation for the UK. However, the estimates are not statistically different from zero.
14 Hence, although point estimates are roughly in line with those found using TSLS, imposing the functional form implied by the model leads to weaker or no evidence of a positive relation between the inflation deviation from target and the rate of unemployment. The finding that unemployment is not helpful in forecasting inflation is consistent with a version of the model where the central banker targets the natural rate of unemployment. However, given the sample sizes currently available to estimate inflation-targeting models, it is also possible that this finding simply reflects the larger uncertainty regarding the model parameters that is associated with small samples.
As anticipated from the empirical analysis in Section 2.2, the estimate of γ is negative for Canada and in most cases it is statistically different from zero. This result indicates that unemployment is helpful in forecasting the rate of inflation (as expected) but in an opposite direction as predicted by the model. Thus, it would appear that this simple game-theoretical model of monetary policy might not completely capture the statistical relation between inflation and unemployment in the case of Canada.
Robustness Analysis
This section examines the robustness of the results to a different estimation procedure and discusses other theories that could also account for the empirical results.
Consider the case where the conditional variance of inflation is assumed to be a function of lagged squared residuals, as in the ARCH model proposed by Engle (1982) . In this case, lagged squared rates of inflation are implicitly included among the explanatory variables. Since Portmanteau tests (not reported) indicate that residuals are serially correlated, estimates are likely to be biased and inconsistent. In preliminary work, I parameterized the conditional variance of inflation as a function of lagged squared changes in the oil price, which could be plausibly assumed to be exogenous (Hamilton 1983) . However, its coefficient is not statistically different from zero, and the results are similar to the ones obtained under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity.
One could also consider a more general model with asymmetric preferences over both inflation and unemployment. The model solution differs from Equation (14) in two ways. First, although the relationship between π t and u t is still positive and nonlinear, the functional form is slightly different. Second, the conditional variance of unemployment becomes one of the arguments of the nonlinear function, along with E tϪ1 u t . Since tests for neglected ARCH indicate that unemployment is conditionally homoskedastic, this amounts to including a second constant term in the nonlinear function. The restricted intercept Ϫ(αր2)σ 2 π remain unchanged. Hence, this generalization of the model does not appear to fundamentally alter the model predictions. In related research, Ruge-Murcia (2001a) estimates a model with asymmetric unemployment preferences for the G7 countries. Reduced-form estimates do not support the hypothesis as asymmetric unemployment preferences for Canada and the UK. This paper relaxes the usual linear-quadratic framework in a particular dimension. That is, it relaxes the assumption of a quadratic objective function but preserves the linear constraint (the expectations-augmented Phillips curve). Alternatively, one could consider a model where the objective function is quadratic but the supply function is nonlinear. This is the strategy followed by Nobay and Peel (2000) . These authors show analytically that the nonlinearity of the supply schedule yields ambiguous implications for average inflation. Numerical simulations indicate that a convex supply function produces upward, rather than downward, inflation deviations from the target. Only a less-plausible, concave supply function yields deviations consistent with the observed inflation.
The assumption of normality is useful in deriving closed-form analytical results. However, it is possible that in reality the distribution of the shocks deviates in an important manner from normality. Whether misspecification in the distribution of the shocks could affect the results is examined in three ways. First, Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) standard errors robust to deviations from normality were also computed and used in statistical inference. As reported in the preceding section, t-tests based on QML standard errors tend to reject the null hypothesis of quadratic preferences more strongly than do those based on asymptotic standard errors. Second, the model is estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which does not require explicit assumptions regarding the model disturbances.
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To be precise, I estimate a version of the first-order condition of the central banker's problem that does not exploit the assumption of normality and use E tϪ1 u n t ϭ E tϪ1 u t to substitute out the unobserved natural unemployment rate:
The instruments are a constant and two unemployment lags. GMM estimates of α obtained using the targeted measure of inflation are 4.13(2.01), 0.74(0.23), and 1.57(0.34) for Canada, Sweden, and the UK, respectively. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Note that in all cases, α is positive and statistically different from zero. In the case of Canada, the GMM estimate of this preference parameter is numerically similar to the FIML estimate. In the case of Sweden and the UK, the GMM estimate of α is smaller than, but still consistent with, the FIML estimate. The χ 2 statistics for the test of the overidentifying restrictions are 0.55, 0.02, and 6.61 for Canada, Sweden, and the UK, respectively. Under the null hypothesis, this statistic is distributed chi-square with one degree of freedom. The overidentifying restriction is not rejected at the 5% level for Canada or Sweden. In the case of the UK, it is rejected at the 5% level but not at the 1% level. In summary, GMM delivers qualitatively the same results as those obtained using FIML.
Third, a Monte-Carlo study is used to assess whether the finding α Ͼ 0 can be the result of asymmetric shocks rather than asymmetric preferences. The strategy is to generate artificial data using the quadratic model but with shocks drawn for an asymmetric distribution. Then, an asymmetric-preference model is estimated under the (incorrect) assumption that shocks are normally distributed. The question asked is whether a researcher would be more likely to find α ≠ 0 in these circumstances. The data are generated by the following quadraticspecification:
). The disturbance ε t is drawn from an asymmetric chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom and is independent of w t . Since the mean of a chi-square distribution equals the number of degrees of freedom, the distribution of ε t is centered around zero by substracting Ϫ1 from each draw. Recall that the variance of a chi-square distribution is twice the number of degrees of freedom. Thus, σ π ϭ σ ε ϭ Ί2. Experiments are based on 100 replications using sample sizes of 2000 and 200 observations. For the unemployment process, 100 extra observations were generated in every replication. Then, for the estimation of the model, the initial 100 observations were discarded in order to limit the effect of starting values used to generate the observations of u t .
Monte-Carlo results are reported in Table 5 . In both the small-and large-sample experiments, all parameter estimates are close to their true value. The Type I error of the test that the parameters take their true values are well within their 95% confidence interval around the nominal size of 5%. The only exception is the estimate of σ π , where there is considerable overrejection regardless of the sample size. Focusing more precisely on the preference parameter, note that if the true model were quadratic, estimates using a misspecified normal distribution when the true distribution is asymmetric would be unlikely to lead to the conclusion that the central banker's preferences are asymmetric.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper constructs a tractable game-theoretical model of monetary policy that permits asymmetries in the central banker's preferences. In particular, the central banker is concerned about both the sign and magnitude of inflation deviations from the desired rate. The preference specification is general in that it nests the standard quadratic function as a special case. It is shown that some of the conclusions derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the functional form of the central banker's loss function. Quadratic preferences predict that the average inflation deviation from the target should be nonnegative and linearly related to unemployment. Since this overshooting is rationally anticipated by the public, the targeting policy can only be imperfectly credible. Asymmetric preferences predict that the average inflation deviation from the target depends on the conditional mean of inflation, is related nonlinearly to unemployment, and can be positive or negative, depending on the central banker's preference parameters. Theoretical results are based on the idea that under asymmetric preferences, certainty equivalence no longer holds and uncertainty can induce prudent behavior on the part of the central banker.
The empirical predictions of the model are examined using data from three inflation-targeting countries, namely Canada, Sweden, and the UK. Results support the notion of asymmetric preferences in the form of a positive and statistically significant estimate of the asymmetry preference parameter. This suggests that departures from the linear-quadratic framework could be relevant in actual policy making and that inflation targeting might be a credible framework for the conduct of monetary policy. Empirical results basically reflect the fact that for these countries, inflation has been generally below target. This observation is inconsistent with quadratic preferences and with standard formulations of the Phillips curve (linear or convex).
However, in interpreting the empirical results it is very important to keep in mind other explanations that might contribute to the finding of asymmetry in preferences. Asymmetric shocks (of a form not considered above) coupled with long lags in monetary policy might yield persistent deviations from the target. The strategic interaction of the central banker and the government could affect the selection of the inflation targets themselves. Although this paper allows for the strategic interaction of the central banker and the public, equilibrium concepts other than Nash might be empirically important. For example, it could be argued that the persistent undershooting of inflation targets might be part of an effort by the central banker to show her commitment to the policy. Current and future research by the author seeks to address these observations. Still, given our limited understanding of central bankers' behavior and preferences, it is probably premature to dismiss the notion that prudence can play a role in modern monetary policy making. NOTES 1. Alternatively, one could assume a Neo-Keynesian Phillips curve where output depends on future expected inflation and output. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999, p. 1672) show that, under discretion, the first-order condition of the central banker's problem is exactly the same as the one obtained using a Lucas-type supply curve. The reason is that, under discretion, the public's expectations are taken as given and future output and inflation do not depend on today's actions. This equivalence might not hold under commitment or in models where the natural rate of unemployment is endogenous.
2. The assumption of normality is crucial for obtaining an analytical solution, but Section 2.4 examines the robustness of empirical results to shocks drawn from a different distribution.
3. As an alternative to Equation (4), one could postulate an aggregate demand relation [for example, as in Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) ]. In this case, the model solution is unchanged but the structural interpretation of the reduced-form disturbances is slightly different. 5. Strictly speaking, the reaction function relates the policy instrument, i t , to π e t , both of which are determined in the previous period. However, in what follows, it will be convenient to work with E tϪ1 π t rather than i t . Since these two variables are monotonically related by the function f(·), this approach entails no loss of generality.
6. To my knowledge, this point was first made by Nobay and Peel (1998) . 7. Although the natural rate of unemployment is not directly observed, it is possible to write the model in terms of inflation and unemployment alone, for which data are available. This is done below in Section 2.3.
8. This point has also been made by Peel (1998) and Cukierman (2000) . 9. Australia, New Zealand, and Israel also employ inflation targets in the conduct of their monetary policy. Unfortunately, their statistical offices publish data on inflation and/or unemployment only on a quarterly basis. This means that, since inflation targeting is a relatively recent policy, the number of observations available to estimate and test the model for these countries is too small to yield reliable results. At the time of collecting the sample (fall of 2000), there are only 23, 39, and 34 observations of both inflation and unemployment for Australia, New Zealand, and Israel, respectively. 10. A number of authors [for example, Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) ] construct estimates of the natural rate using data on inflation and unemployment. However, in the context of this model, it is clear that such estimates provide no additional information beyond that already contained in π t and u t .
11. Results using a low-order ARMA process yielded virtually the same results as reported below and are available from the author upon request.
12. The working paper version of this article [Ruge-Murcia (2001b) ] shows that empirical results are robust to using an I(1) or an I(0) model to forecast unemployment. This is not surprising because the one-step-ahead predictions of a persistent variable computed using a nonstationary or a persistent stationary process are likely to be very similar.
13. Even though the limit of the log-likelihood function as α → 0 exists, strictly speaking the function is not continuous at the point α ϭ 0. To circumvent this problem, I have used Wald-type t-tests to assess the significance of α .
14. As seen in Columns (3) and (4), this result depends on the estimate of the standard error employed to construct the t-statistic.
15. The idea of using GMM to estimate the model was suggested to me by René Garcia.
